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I. INTRODUCTION  
The genesis of the procedure most commonly described as female circumcision 
(FC) or female genital mutilation (FGM) is rooted in antiquity.1 The ritual has 
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 1 Though the origin of FGR is unknown, the Greek historian Strabo found evidence of the 
procedure among ancient Egyptians in early first century A.D. See DAVID L. GOLLAHER, 
CIRCUMCISION: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD‘S MOST CONTROVERSIAL SURGERY 195-96 
(2000).  His finding was corroborated in a fourth century papyrus from St. Ambrosius of 
Milan, which recorded, as did Strabo, that Egyptians circumcised both males and females.  Id.   
From this early beginning, FGR spread to different parts of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and 
Latin America. Rationales for the practice are as diverse as the communities in which it has 
been firmly established, but practitioners typically justify their action as a religious or cultural 
prescription aimed at promoting cleanliness, ensuring virginity, preventing promiscuity, 
enhancing aesthetic beauty of the vagina/surrounding tissues, and improving marital 
prospects. See ELLEN GRUENBAUM, THE FEMALE CIRCUMCISION CONTROVERSY: AN 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2001) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the cultural 
context of FGR and its underlying rationales and assumptions).  
  Historically, the procedure was known, like its male counterpart, simply as circumcision 
or ―FC‖; but over the last two decades, additional terms, carefully crafted to serve one agenda 
or the other, have been added to the corpus of descriptive terms. The pejorative term ―FGM‖ 
is most widely used, though many commentators have explicitly rejected its usage, choosing, 
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existed for centuries amongst different cultures but is currently practiced primarily in 
twenty-eight African countries, parts of the Middle East, and increasingly among 
immigrant populations in Europe, North America, and Australia.2 The World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimates that between 100 and 140 million girls and women 
have undergone the procedure,3 out of which 91.5 million are in Africa.4 Of these 
91.5 million girls and women, more than half are in three countries ranking amongst 
the highest in prevalence rates: Egypt, Ethiopia, and northern Sudan.5 Desegregated 
figures show that the prevalence rates vary dramatically amongst practicing nations, 
from as high as 96% in Egypt to as low as 0.6% in Uganda.6 Globally, around two 
million girls are at risk of undergoing the procedure annually.7 Because FGR is 
inextricably embedded in the cultural ethos of practicing nations, outsiders‘ attempts 
to reconceptualize the practice as unnecessary, unjustifiable, or harmful have proved 
largely unfruitful. Even in countries that have been successfully goaded into 
criminalizing the procedure, often by external forces, compliance has not matched 
                                                          
instead, to adopt more culturally sensitive appellations. Cook and colleagues, for instance, 
prefer ―female cutting,‖ which they perceive to be neutral and less offensive to people whose 
culture endorses the ritual. See REBECCA J. COOK ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTEGRATING MEDICINE, ETHICS AND LAW 263 (2003). Similarly, 
Gruenbaum uses ―FC,‖ although somewhat grudgingly, ―to avoid the connotations of evil 
intentions or wanton mayhem associated with the term ―mutilation.‖‘ See id. at 4. Nancy 
Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, on the other hand, settled on three terms, namely, ―female genital 
cutting‖, ―FC,‖ and ―female genital surgery,‖ unapologetically rejecting ―FGM,‖ which they 
consider unnecessarily inflammatory. See Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the 
Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 72 n.4 
(2005).  
  While I share these sentiments, in that I consider ―FGM‖ to be an unnecessarily 
offensive, outrageous and counterproductive descriptive term, the nature of my discourse 
makes employing the term imperative since a critical part of my main argument centers on the 
term itself. But, aside from specific circumstances where a different term would be clearly 
inappropriate, I endorse the terms identified above, in addition to ―female genital ritual‖ 
(FGR)—a designation which is used throughout this discourse as a constellation of all forms 
and versions of the procedure.  
 2 E. Turillazzi & V. Fineschi, Female Genital Mutilation: The Ethical Impact of the New 
Italian Law, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 98, 98 (2007). 
 3 Female Genital Mutilation, Fact Sheet No. 241, WHO 2 (2001), http://www.who. 
int/mip2001/files/2270/241-FemaleGenitalMutilationforMIP.pdf [hereinafter WHO]. 
 4 P. Stanley Yoder & Shane Khan, Numbers of Women Circumcised in Africa: The 
Production of a Total, MACRO INTERNATIONAL INC. (Mar. 2008), http://www.measuredhs.c 
om/pubs/pdf/WP39/WP39.pdf. But note that the figure excludes girls younger than 10 and 
covers only 20 countries for which data was available. Compared to earlier reports, prevalence 
is declining. For instance, although Egypt remains the country with the highest proportion of 
FGR, the figure is falling—from 97% in 1998 to 95.8% in 2005—whereas the current 
prevalence rate of 0.6% in Uganda represents a steep drop from the 1998 level of 5%. See 
Female Genital Mutilation: An Overview, WHO (1998), https://apps.who.int/dsa/cat98/fgm 
book.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (providing 1998 estimates). 
 5 Yoder & Khan, supra note 4, at 7.  
 6 Id. at 8. 
 7 WHO, supra note 3. 
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expectation.8 For centuries, the practice, like many others that are culture-driven, 
was not a subject of international concern—that is, until recently. There is a growing 
consensus that the influx of Africans and Arabs into Western countries contributed 
to international involvement in what, heretofore, was generally regarded as a 
legitimate cultural practice worthy of deference and respect. With escalating 
conflicts and internal strife in many African and Middle Eastern countries, an 
appreciable number of inhabitants are forced to seek refuge in Western countries. 
One of the more visible results of this tragic exodus was that the aftermath of a 
cultural ritual, once confined to distant lands, began to be seen in social welfare 
offices and health clinics in Europe and North America. And this, not surprisingly, 
raised some eyebrows.  
In a move reminiscent of the scramble for the partition of Africa, commentators 
of various disciplines are, with the publication of each new ―finding,‖ edging closer 
to unanimity in their strident denunciation of the ritual.9 Their condemnations fall 
                                                          
 8 A good illustration is Uganda‘s Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act 2010, 
which became operational April 9, 2010. The law, which severely punishes activities related 
to FGR (a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years for anyone who performs the ritual 
and not less than five for procuring, aiding, and abetting or attempting the ritual), has only 
succeeded in driving the practice underground. See Fredrick Womakuyu, FGM Thrives 
Despite Government Ban, NEW VISION (Uganda) (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.newvision.co.ug/ 
D/9/183/743102 (reporting that ―[g]irls are now being mutilated secretly in huts and in caves. 
They are also cut in the wee hours of the morning. Strangers are no longer welcome at the 
venues.‖); see also Alison Slack, Female Circumcision: A Critical Appraisal, 10 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 437, 478 (1988) (noting that one of the reasons anti-FGM legislation failed in Kenya, 
Sudan, and Egypt is that ―[m]ost of the laws were the by-products of external pressure and did 
not reflect the desire of the local people to suppress the tradition‖).   
 9 What I have in mind approximates Thomas Pakenham‘s description of the invaders of 
the continent ―as outsiders of one kind or another but no less ardent‖ in their crusade, a 
crusade ―they all conceived of . . . in terms of romantic nationalism,‖ hoping to ―save Africa 
from itself.‖ Replace ―romantic nationalism‖ with ―cultural romanticism‖ and the similarity 
with the tenor of a vast majority of commentaries against FGR becomes striking. See THE 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: WHITE MAN‘S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876-
1912, xxii (1992). As a University of Chicago anthropologist elucidates:  
[i]f you read and believe those statements or most of the other things you find 
written about ―FGM‖ in the popular press (which, for the most part, are 
recapitulations of the advocacy literature) then you must conclude that Africa is 
indeed a ―Dark Continent,‖ where for hundreds, if not thousands of years, 
African parents have been murdering and maiming their daughters and 
depriving them of the capacity for a sexual response. You must believe that 
African parents (mothers and fathers) are either (a) monsters (―mutilators‖ of 
their children); or (b) fools (who are incredibly ignorant of the health 
consequences of their own child rearing practices and the best interests of their 
children); or (c) prisoners of an insufferably dangerous tradition that they 
themselves would like to escape, if only they could find a way out; or else (d) 
that African women are weak and passive and live under the patriarchal thumb 
of cruel, loathsome or barbaric African men.  
See Richard Shweder, When Cultures Collide: Which Rights? Whose Tradition of Values? A 
Critique of the Global Anti-FGM Campaign, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE BULWARKS OF 
LOCALISM: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 181, 184 (Christopher Eisgruber & Andras Sajo 
eds., 2005). 
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under three broad strands: the ritual is extremely hazardous to the physical and 
mental health of affected girls and women; the ritual violates their human right to 
bodily integrity insofar as fully informed consent was neither sought nor obtained; 
and the ritual perpetuates gender inequality and subjugation in practicing 
communities.10 Although there are stark differences between FGM and FC, there has 
been a tendency to lump them together and proceed, on the basis of the conflation, to 
prescribe the same response to the two procedures: eradication.11  
This Article is a repudiation of the one-size-fits-all approach. It argues that owing 
to several factors, particularly the unbridled passion surrounding the subject, several 
important issues have fallen prey to intensely misguided pejoration, 
mischaracterizations, and distortions; yet, extricating and coherently realigning these 
issues in a meticulously nuanced way is a key component of resolving what is 
already a highly-charged polemic. Unlike previous discourse on the subject, this 
Article will not defend either procedure, will not lump the procedures together, and, 
as has previously been achieved, perhaps unwittingly, will not contribute to further 
obfuscation of the subject.12 Instead, this Article has two objectives: first, to classify 
                                                          
 10 Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, Female Genital Surgeries: The Known, the Unknown, and 
the Unknowable 13 MED. ANTHROPOL. Q. 79, 79 (1999). 
 11 The claims made here pertaining to FC apply with equal force to other less invasive 
forms of FGR (insignificant cuts), such as pricking the clitoris to draw blood. Their shared 
characteristic is that they are generally harmless and are therefore worthy of consideration as 
alternatives to more severe forms of FGR. 
 12 There is vast literature on the subject. See generally ASMA EL DAREER, WOMAN, WHY 
DO YOU WEEP? CIRCUMCISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1982); EFUA DORKENOO, 
CUTTING THE ROSE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: THE PRACTICE AND ITS PREVENTION 
(1994); EFUA DORKENOO & SCILLA ELWORTHY, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (1992); FEMALE CIRCUMCISION: MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf ed., 2006); ELLEN GRUENBAUM, supra note 1; Ylva Hernlund, 
Cutting Without Ritual and Ritual Without Cutting: Female “Circumcision” and the Re-
Ritualization of Initiation in the Gambia, FEMALE ―CIRCUMCISION‖ IN AFRICA: CULTURE, 
CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE 235-253 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund eds., 2000); 
FRAN P. HOSKEN, THE HOSKEN REPORT (1979); HANNY LIGHTFOOT-KLEIN, PRISONERS OF 
RITUAL: AN ODYSSEY INTO FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION IN AFRICA (1989); Obioma 
Nnaemeke, If Female Circumcision Did Not Exist, Western Feminism Would Invent It, EYE 
TO EYE: WOMEN PRACTISING DEVELOPMENT ACROSS CULTURES 171-189 (Susan Perry & 
Celeste Schenck eds., 2000); E.D. PRIDIE ET AL., FEMALE CIRCUMCISION IN THE ANGLO-
EGYPTIAN SUDAN (1945); ANIKA RAHMAN & NAHID TOUBIA, FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS AND POLICIES WORLDWIDE (2000); LILIAN PASSMORE 
SANDERSON, AGAINST THE MUTILATION OF WOMEN: THE STRUGGLE TO END 
UNNECESSARY SUFFERING (1981); NAHID TOUBIA, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A CALL 
FOR GLOBAL ACTION (1995); ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (1960); 
WARRIOR MARKS: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND THE SEXUAL BLINDING OF 
WOMEN (Alice Walker & Parmar Pratibha eds., 1993); Sami Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, To 
Mutilate in the Name of Jehovah or Allah: Legitimization of Male and Female Circumcision, 
13 MED. & L. 575 (1994); Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Rethinking Feminist Discourses on 
Female Genital Mutilation: The Case of Sudan, 15 CAN. WOMEN STUD. 52, 52-54 (1995); 
Frances A. Althaus, Female Circumcision: Rite of Passage or Violation of Rights?, 23 INT‘L 
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 130 (1997); Hanny Lightfoot-Klein, The Sexual Experience and Marital 
Adjustment of Genitally Circumcised and Infibulated Females in the Sudan, 26 J. SEX 
RESEARCH 375 (1989); L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and 
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and rank the procedures on morally informed grounds, and second, based on the 
ranking, to argue for different perspectives on, and treatment of, the two procedures. 
Along the same trajectory, this Article considers the issues surrounding voluntary 
FGR and explores whether sanction is a morally defensible response. An argument 
for a distinction between forced and voluntary FGR as a basis for apportioning 
sanction is made and defended. 
This Article consists of seven sections. Following the introduction, Part II 
reconstructs the debate as to whether FGR is a legitimate cultural practice or a 
human rights violation, and it sets forth the major arguments. Part III delves into, 
and debunks, the moral relativist argument regarding FGR. Part IV seeks to 
determine whether FGM is evil. A foray into the theory of evil, the section draws 
critical distinctions between FC and FGM and explains why the distinctions are of 
paramount moral importance. Part IV also concludes that FGM is evil, and thus, 
among the issues related to the betterment of women worldwide, FGM deserves 
more attention. Part IV seeks to determine whether FGM is evil. A foray into the 
theory of evil, the section draws critical distinctions between FC and FGM and 
shows how the distinctions are of paramount moral importance. The section argues 
that FGM (real cases and without consent) is evil, deserving of priority attention in 
the overall scheme of attending to the overall wellbeing and betterment of women 
while, at the same time, maintaining that FC, even when performed on non-
consenting women, is distinctly not evil.13 Part V addresses whether there are ethical 
bases for opposing bona fide cases of FGM. Relying on the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence, in addition to ethics of care, Part V returns an affirmative 
response. Part VI examines the antidotal adequacy of the existing human rights 
framework. Because human rights norms, in their current incarnation that prohibit 
FGR fail to draw a distinction between consenting adults and those forced to 
undergo the procedure and fail to recognize the difference between FC and FGM, 
Part VI argues that the framework is defective. Because, in their current incarnation, 
human rights norms prohibiting female FGR fail to draw a distinction between 
consenting adults and those forced to undergo the procedure, and fail to recognize 
the difference between FC and FGM, Part VI argues that the framework is defective. 
Part VII asserts that education and awareness campaigns are more productive paths 
to eradication than criminalization.  
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE DEBATE 
Before plunging into the tasks of this Article, some basic knowledge about the 
nature of FGR seems instructive. What follows is the story of a Somali-British 
teenager, reported to have undergone the procedure a few years ago.14 Lali was three 
when her family migrated to London from war-torn Somalia.15 Like her 
                                                          
Intransigence in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 
(1997).  
 13 The argument made in this section regarding FC applies with equal force to other less 
invasive forms of FGR such as ceremonial pricking of clitoris, all of which come under the 
rubric ―moral wrong.‖ 
 14 Jo-Ann and David Jones, The Unspeakable Practice of Female Circumcision That’s 
Destroying Young Women’s Lives in Britain, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 3, 2008).  
 15  Id. The child‘s name was changed to Lali to protect her identity.      
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contemporaries, Lali learned English quickly and adjusted to her adoptive country.16 
But her happiness was short-lived. At age eleven, Lali was taken to an undisclosed 
location to be circumcised, together with other Somali girls whose mothers, like 
Lali‘s, had flown a cutter from their country of origin to circumcise their daughters.17 
Upon arriving at the house, Lali was wrestled to the floor by a group of women 
which, to Lali‘s dismay, included relatives, family friends, and her own mother.18 
Once pinned to the floor, and without the aid of an anesthetic, the cutter was invited 
to perform the ritual.19 The pain was excruciating and quite difficult to bear, 
especially for a young girl.20 As Lali later recalled: ―They held me down, and when 
the woman began cutting[,] I screamed, so my friend‘s sister put her hand tightly 
over my mouth.‖21 More disturbing, as Lali further explained: ―I had known her and 
these other women all my life, and now they were doing . . . this[ to me].‖22 For girls 
like Lali, the scar left by the betrayal of people divinely assigned to her stewardship 
can have serious psychological consequences and, possibly, medical complications.  
Revulsion at this sort of experience is at the root of widespread clamor for the 
eradication of FGR. Yet, there seems to be little, if any, agreement on the basic 
elements of the procedure. It remains unsettled whether the appropriate descriptive 
term for the procedure is FGM or FC. Even its medical and psychological 
consequences are mired in controversy.23 Nonetheless, if meaningful progress is to 
be made in the march toward proscription of the practice, factors disrupting 
reasonable and effective dialogue on these issues need to be unraveled. Distortions 
must be fleshed out and meaningfully analyzed; otherwise, progress toward 
containment may prove unsustainable.  
Not long ago, the term FC was used universally, including in medical literature. 
However, its use is increasingly discarded in favor of the term FGM, a preference 
based upon the idea that the term FC falsely analogizes FGM to male circumcision, 
thereby confusing two remarkably distinct practices.24 The term FGM is meant to 
                                                          
 16  Id.    
 17  Id.  
 18 Id.   
 19 Id.  
 20 Id.    
 21 Id.  
 22 Id.  
 23 Yoder P. Stanley et al., Female Genital Cutting and Coming of Age in Guinea, MACRO 
INTERNATIONAL INC., 3 (Dec. 1999), http://www.measuredhs.com/topics/gender/FGC-CD/pd 
fs/FGCinGuinea.pdf.   
 24 Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement: UNAIDS, UNDP, 
UNECA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, WHO, WHO 22 
(2008), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw52/statements_missions/Interagency_St 
atement_on_Eliminating_FGM.pdf [hereinafter WHO]; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 119 (1999).  
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more aptly capture the gruesome and harmful nature of the procedure.25 More 
importantly, the new term recasts the procedure more concretely as a human rights 
violation, thereby providing a more robust ground upon which to campaign for its 
abolition.26 Casting FGM as a human rights violation removes the practice from the 
arena of culture (and its attendant legitimacy) and makes it more susceptible to 
objective moral criticism. The term FGM was adopted in 1990 at the third 
conference of the Inter-African Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the 
Health of Women and Children (IAC), an international private organization based in 
Dakar, Senegal.27 Since 1991, when WHO recommended that the United Nations 
(U.N.) adopt the term FGM,28 its use has spread like wild fire. The new term is 
embraced not only by the U.N. and its agencies, but also by a plurality of scholars, 
pundits, and activist groups pushing various agendas.  
WHO defines FGM as ―procedures involving partial or total removal of the 
external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical 
reasons.‖29 Implicit in this definition is the notion that so long as the purpose is non-
therapeutic, excision of any part of external female genitalia is mutilation, regardless 
of the degree and size of the tissue removed. This overly broad definition is at the 
root of the controversy surrounding the practice, for it erroneously ascribes 
mutilation to virtually all forms of FGR, even those that cannot reasonably be 
described as such. Three variations of FGR are commonly practiced. In type I (a 
clitoridectomy), the clitoris and/or clitoral hood is partially or totally removed.30 
Type II (excision) involves the partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia 
minora, with or without the removal of the labia majora.31 Type III (infibulation or 
pharaonic circumcision) involves cutting the labia minora and/or the labia majora, 
with or without the removal of the clitoris, followed by stitching and narrowing of 
the vaginal orifice.32 Of the three types, types I and II are the most prevalent, 
undergone by approximately 85% of genitally cut women throughout the world.33 
                                                          
 25 Richard A. Shweder, Disputing the myth of sexual dysfunction of circumcised women, 
25 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 14, 17 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.arts.uregina.ca/ 
dbfm_send/637.     
 26 WHO, supra note 24, at 22.   
 27 Id.  
 28 UNICEF, Changing a Harmful Social Convention: Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, INNOCENT DIGEST 2 (2005), http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/f 
gm_eng.pdf. 
 29 Id. at 1. 
 30 WHO, supra note 24, at 4. 
 31 Id. 
 32 The procedures are ranked in order of severity, from least to most severe. WHO 
specifies a fourth (type IV) category which comprises pricking, piercing, incising of the 
clitoris and/or labia, and other harmful procedure to the female genitalia for non-medical 
purposes. Type IV procedures, however, are generally not included in FGM discourse. See 
WHO, supra note 24, at 4; Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 120. 
 33 NAHID TOUBIA, Female Genital Mutilation, in WOMEN‘S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 224, 226 (J. S. Peters  & Andrea Wolper eds., 
1995). 
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The remaining 15% are subjected to type III, the most radical and dangerous of the 
three types, commonly practiced in only three countries: Djibouti, Sudan, and 
Somalia.34 
This taxonomy, which has been adopted by a vast majority of local and 
international organizations, has attracted criticisms from several quarters, especially 
third-world scholars with an intimate knowledge of the procedures. Writing in 
opposition to a bill that would outlaw FGR in Nigeria, Nowa Omoigui, a Nigerian-
born cardiologist practicing in the United States, questioned the wisdom of 
mischaracterizing circumcision as mutilation, and, as a result, lumping together all 
forms of FGR under the pejorative umbrella: FGM.35 ―There is a huge difference 
between [c]ircumcision and [m]utilation,‖ Omoigui argues.36 ―To group all forms of 
age old religious circumcision into one large category under the guise of medical 
enlightenment and ‗civilization‘ is very unfortunate.‖37 Omoigui attacks the idea that 
every genital ritual connotes the same horror or has the same consequences as 
clitoridectomy, excision, or infibulation.38 Referring to Edo women in Nigeria, for 
whom circumcision is limited to the removal of the prepuce (preputium clitoridis)—
the fold of skin that covers the clitoris and which has no sexual or reproductive 
value—Omoigui notes that, for these women, circumcision involves the mutilation 
of neither the clitoris nor any other part of the genitalia.39 ―In fact, in many cases the 
‗removal‘ is symbolic and part of a traditional marriage ceremony.‖40 A similar 
argument has been advanced regarding the Ibos, one of the most populous ethnic 
                                                          
 34 Borgna Brunner, The Abolition of Female Genital Mutilation: The Abolition of 
Female Genital Mutilation Has Become a Worldwide Human Rights Cause, INFOPLEASE 
(2007), http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001524.html. 
 35 Nowa Omoigui, Protest Against Bill H22 Outlawing “FGM” in Nigeria, J. CULTURE & 
AFR. WOMEN STUD. 1 (2001), http://www.africaknowledgeproject.org/index.php/jenda/art 
icle/view/38. Some writers have even gone as far as labeling the procedure ―sexual 
castration.‖ See, e.g., Mohamed Badawi, Epidemiology of Female Sexual Castration in Cairo, 
Egypt, Paper Presented at The First International Symposium on Circumcision, Anaheim, 
California (Mar. 1-2, 1989), http://www.nocirc.org/symposia/first/badawi.html; FRAN P. 
HOSKEN, THE HOSKEN REPORT: GENITAL AND SEXUAL MUTILATION OF FEMALES 353 
(1994). 
 36 Omoigui, supra note 35.   
 37  Id.   
 38 Nahid Toubia seems to be the only one among leading commentators on the subject 
cognizant of this distinction. See Toubia, supra note 33, at 225. 
 39 Omoigui, supra note 35.  
 40 To the contrary, it could be argued that not removing the prepuce is a hindrance to 
maximizing sexual rights of women. This follows from the fact that women whose prepuces 
have been removed enjoy greater sexual satisfaction—more intense and, in some cases, 
multiple orgasms. See Gruenbaum, supra note 1, at 143-44; Michael P. Goodman et al., A 
Large Multicenter Outcome Study of Female Genital Plastic Surgery, 7 J SEX MED. 1565 
(2010); G. J. Alter, Aesthetic Labia Minora and Clitoral Hood Reduction Using Extended 
Central Wedge Resection, 122 PLAST. RECONSTR. SURG. 1780 (2008); infra note 51. 
2012] “CIRCUMCISION” OR “MUTILATION”? 93 
 
groups in Nigeria, for whose people circumcision often involves the removal of only 
the prepuce.41  
Though the procedure Omoigui describes does not involve mutilation as the word 
is ordinarily understood, the WHO type I classification nonetheless holds otherwise, 
characterizing as mutilation any removal of the prepuce, even if the clitoris is left 
untouched.42 The operative words in the WHO classification are: partial or total 
removal of the clitoris and/or the prepuce.43 This mischaracterization is widespread. 
For instance, although in her book, Sex and Social Justice, Martha Nussbaum, 
professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, claimed that her discussion is 
―confined to cases that involve substantial removal of tissue and/or functional 
impairment,‖ her subsequent discussion deviates from her self-imposed limited focus 
in favor of the popular paradigm.44 She makes no attempt to draw distinctions 
between procedures that are truly mutilatory and those that are not. Instead, she uses 
the term ―amputation‖ to describe an act that destroys nothing other than prepuce, a 
tissue that serves no useful function: ―The male equivalent of the clitoridectomy 
would be the amputation of most of the penis.‖45 The removal of limbs or other 
appendages can be accurately described as ―amputation,‖ but not insignificant tissues 
such as prepuce or toenails. For instance, because clipping a toenail involves 
removing the outgrowth nail only, it is a simple process that is associated with 
nothing as gory as amputation. Thus, it would be silly to describe it as such. 
Moreover, using terms that convey extremely exaggerated meanings serve no 
purpose other than to obfuscate the issues. And that, for better or worse, has been the 
contribution of the terms ―amputation‖ and ―mutilation‖ to the debate regarding the 
legitimacy of FGR as a cultural practice.46   
                                                          
 41 See Omoigui, supra note 22. These less serious forms of FGR are not exclusive to 
Nigeria. Gruenbaum describes a type of procedure she observed among the Zabarma people in 
Sudan: ―the Zabarma believe that only the sunna circumcision should be done, and as they 
described it and showed me on a little girl, they take almost nothing off.‖ See Gruenbaum, 
supra note 1, at 121-22. 
 42 WHO, supra note 3, at 1.   
 43 Id.   
 44 Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 119. 
 45 Nussbaum says that in clitoridectomy, the clitoris or part of it is amputated. See id. at 
120. But even if it granted that clitoridectomy somehow amounts to clitoral amputation, the 
generalization to include prepuce removal is certainly an exaggeration. Like Nussbaum, 
Obermeyer questions the accuracy of the term FC since it ―implies that the surgery is 
equivalent to that which removes the prepuce of the penis, when it is in fact a good deal more 
extensive, removing as it does part or all of the clitoris.‖ See Obermeyer, supra note 10, at 84. 
This observation (or reversal thereof) is precisely the bone of Omoigui‘s contention—that, in 
fact, there exists a form of female ritual that terminates in prepuce removal, without tampering 
with the rest of the clitoris/genitalia; see also Gruenbaum, supra note 1, at 121-22 (describing 
a type of FGR in which ―almost nothing‖ is taken off). 
 46 Other scholars have followed Nussbaum‘s lead. See, e.g., Althaus, supra note 12, at 131 
(stating that ―the amputation of the clitoris and other sensitive tissue reduces a woman‘s 
ability to experience sexual pleasure‖) (emphasis added). But this claim has been challenged 
by more recent studies. See, e.g., Lucrezia Catania et al., Pleasure and Orgasm in Women with 
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C), 4 J. SEX MED. 1666, 1673 (2007) (finding that a 
vast majority of women that have undergone FGR of all types, even those that have been 
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Dubbing as ―mutilation‖ all forms of FGR was, of course, no happenstance. 
Purveyors clearly intended to convey a grisly and ghastly image, and to shock the 
moral sensibilities of everyone, which forced worldwide action. They seem poised to 
succeed, as evinced by the deluge of newspaper, television, and scholarly articles 
lambasting FGR and its practitioners. But, in reality, FGM is a far cry from what 
prepuce removal entails. Mutilating the clitoris, in the sense of damaging or 
chopping it off, is not the same as removing its hood. One does not need to approve 
of FC to appreciate these distinctions. Yet, a plurality of commentators gloss over 
these facts.47 Omoigui was struck by this hypocrisy, leading him to question the 
rationale behind ascribing ―mutilation‖ to what he considers to be female 
circumcision.48 On the other hand, whereas abortion, since it involves ―crushing and 
scooping of the body parts of an unborn fetus‖ – a genuine instance of mutilation, is 
never called ―fetal mutilation‖.49 Ultimately, the trend toward misinformation and 
distortions, evident in the erroneous ascription of physical and psychological 
connotations to a significantly less severe form of FGR is counterproductive; such 
attitudes estrange, rather than persuade, practicing societies to rethink the ritual.50 
The appropriate medical nomenclature for FC is ―clitoridotomy‖ or hoodectomy, a 
distinct procedure from a ―clitoridectomy.‖ FC is comparable to male circumcision 
and is commonly offered by physicians, even by physicians in the United States.51 
Rather than cause harm, a clitoridotomy is, in fact, beneficial. By allowing for 
maximum exposure of the clitoris, the procedure makes it possible for women to 
experience multiple, quicker, and more intense orgasms.52 Certainly, sexual 
freedom—the right to enjoy sex without third-party interference—is a human right. 
                                                          
infibulated, achieved orgasm and that the procedure ―does not necessarily have negative 
impacts on psychosocial life (fantasies, desire, pleasure, ability to experience orgasm)‖).   
 47 See, e.g., COOK ET AL., supra note 1, at 262. Although not explicitly stated, the authors 
appear to appreciate the distinction between real cases of clitoridectomy and prepuce removal. 
This is evident from the fact that although they adopted WHO‘s categorization of FGM, they 
carefully omitted the phraseology ―[e]xcision of the prepuce‖ (in the Type I definition) as part 
of the class of prohibited procedures. See A Systematic Review of the Health Complications 
of Female Genital Mutilation Including Sequelae in Childbirth , WHO 11 (2000), 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2000/WHO_FCH_WMH_00.2.pdf. In attempting to distinguish 
FC from male circumcision, the authors point out that in the latter, only the prepuce is 
removed. COOK ET AL., supra note 1, at 264. 
 48 See Omoigui, supra note 35, at 3.   
 49 See Omoigui, supra note 35, at 3; see also Ehrenreich & Barr, supra note 1, at 72 n.4 
(warning that ―one should hesitate to call African genital cutting practices ‗mutilation‘ unless 
one is willing to apply the same term to genital cutting practiced in [the United States]‖ and, 
perhaps, other Western countries). 
 50 Ronan M. Conroy, Female Genital Mutilation, Whose Problem, Whose Solution?: 
Tackle “Cosmetic” Genital Surgery in Rich Countries Before Criticizing Traditional 
Practices Elsewhere, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 106 (2006).  
 51 Royal Benson, III, M.D., a board certified obstetrician/gynecologist, affiliated with The 
Southwest Center for Female Genital Refinement, Texas, provides the procedure at a cost of 
$2,000 – 3,000. See CLITORALUNHOODING.COM, http://www.clitoralunhooding.com/dr-ben 
son.html (last visited June 8, 2011). 
 52 See Gruenbaum, supra note 1, at 143-44. 
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So, why classify all ritualistic genital procedures as FGM? Omoigui argues that such 
rigid classifications are an example of one culture attempting to dominate another, 
under the subterfuge of health and safety concerns.53 He casts the issue as a ―cultural 
war against female circumcision‖ by ill-informed human rights activists who, while 
condemning non-western cultural values, condone same-sex marriage—an 
institution, he says, that is prohibited virtually everywhere else.54 
What do you say to people whose cultural practice is impugned and 
misrepresented in such a blatant fashion? More importantly, how do you enlist their 
support in eradicating what is deemed by outsiders to be a ―harmful cultural 
practice?‖ Whatever the rationale for the extant approach, one of its consequences 
has been the alienation of people whose support is needed to make headway in 
abolishing FGM. This explains why, in many countries with laws on the books 
criminalizing both FGM and FC, the practice continues to flourish. One need not 
mischaracterize FC as mutilation to condemn it, for it too is condemnable on a 
different basis. Steve Nwabuzor, Nigerian scholar and political commentator, pines: 
―[the simple] fact that the West does not perform [female] circumcision as a norm is 
not enough reason to attack [non-Western] values.‖55 Like Omoigui and others 
before him, Nwabuzor is concerned about trivializing and demonizing cultural 
values simply on account of their non-comportment with Western norms.56  
Female circumcision—the removal of the clitoral hood—is comparable to male 
circumcision.57 The clitoral prepuce is anatomically analogous to the penile prepuce, 
and both serve relatively similar functions. Regarding female circumcision, neither 
the procedure nor its consequences resemble a clitoridectomy or other types of FGM. 
A suggestion worth considering is contained in the following recently released study. 
Having discovered that there are forms of FGR that do not fit within the WHO‘s 
classification of mutilation, physician Susan Elmusharaf and her colleagues 
recommend that instead of pigeon-holing every conceivable form of ritualistic 
genital procedures within the WHO‘s classification, a better approach would be to 
classify rituals according to the anatomical extent of the procedure.58 In other words, 
Elmusharaf argues for the creation of a novel classification system that accurately 
reflects the true anatomical extent of the different forms of the procedure.59 Such 
novel classification is, in a sense, the demand of Omoigui and his cohorts. 
III. CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND FEMALE GENITAL RITUAL 
Defenders of FGR view the effort to eradicate female genital rituals as an 
unjustified attempt by the West to impose Western cultural values on others while 
                                                          
 53 Omoigui, supra note 35, at 4. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Steve Nwabuzor, Opposition to Proposed HB 22 on Female Genital Mutilation, J. 
CULTURE & AFR. WOMEN STUD. 1 (2001), http://www.africaknowledgeproject.org/index.php/ 
jenda/article/view39.   
 56 Id. 
 57 Omoigui, supra note 35. 
 58 Susan Elmusharaf et al., Reliability of Self Reported Form of Female Genital Mutilation 
and WHO Classification: Cross Sectional Study, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 127 (2006). 
 59 Id.  
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ignoring the moral deficiencies of Western norms. In other words, the Western effort 
to eradicate FGR is like removing the speck in a stranger‘s eye while ignoring the 
log in your own eye.60 Under the theory of cultural relativism, the practice of 
excising parts of female genitalia is a cultural practice just like any other; the fact 
that the practice is alien to Westerners does not ipso facto make it morally wrong. 
The underlying principle of moral relativism is that moral judgments are not 
universal nor objectively valid.61 Omoigui argues that Western cultural imperialists 
actively support and condone practices, like abortion and homosexuality, which his 
own culture prohibits and deems morally repugnant; yet, these abolitionists still pass 
judgment on practices sanctioned in his culture.62 Valid or not, Omoigui‘s contention 
represents a classic example of cultural relativism, the theory that moral truth is 
culture-bound, that each culture sets its own standards (moral truths), and that no 
culture can ascribe superiority to its own standards.63 
Before grappling with cultural relativism and its application in defense of FGR, 
we must define ―morality;‖ defining morality is crucial here because morality 
functions as the polemic center when analyzing FGR in a philosophical context. In 
its basic form, morality is how we normatively think about, and assign qualities of 
right or wrong to, human actions or inactions; it provides the lens through which we 
judge a particular conduct to be wrong or right.64 Morality comprises a set of 
principles, rules, or precepts upon which judgments about the rightness or wrongness 
of actions are based.65 This is the popular understanding of morality, and one upon 
which both cultural absolutists and cultural relativists agree. For John Cook, 
professor of philosophy, morality ―consist[s] of principles, and because these are 
conceived of as saying what one ought or ought not to do, morality gets represented 
as pertaining essentially to human actions, to what someone can be ordered or 
forbidden to do.‖66 In the context of FGM, the moral debate has centered on whether 
                                                          
 60 Cheryl Chase, “Cultural Practice” or “Reconstructive Surgery”?: U.S. Genital 
Cutting, the Intersex Movement, and Medical Double Standards, in THE REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS READER: LAW, MEDICINE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 47, 55 
(Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (expressing concern that in Western feminist discourse, 
―African genital cutting‖ is depicted ―as primitive, irrational, harmful, and deserving of 
condemnation,‖ while genital cutting among Westerners is represented as ―modern, scientific, 
healing, and above reproach‖). But see Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-
Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 189 (1991-92) (providing a more practical way to state the case for 
cultural relativist and asking ―by what right did I, as a Western feminist, have to criticize as 
right or wrong the practices of an entirely different culture?‖). 
 61 James Rachels, The Challenges of Cultural Relativism, BIOETHICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 119 (Nancy S. Jecker et al., 
eds., 2007) (suggesting that ―the idea of universal truth in ethics . . .  is a myth.‖). 
 62 Omoigui, supra note 35. 
 63 David Agler, Cultural Relativism Handout, http://www.davidagler.com/retired/teaching/ 
ethics/Handout_4_Cultural_Relativism.pdf.   
 64 See JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 125 (1999). 
 65 See COOK, supra note 64, at 117 (citing RAYMOND FIRTH, ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION 183 (1951)). 
 66 Id. at 127. 
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it is morally right for one culture to persevere in an act deemed reprehensible by 
another and whether it is morally right to force change through the coercive powers 
of criminal law. 
But defining morality solely in terms of human action or inaction does not 
provide an adequate account of the term because it neglects other important ways in 
which we think about moral matters.67 We make moral assessments of not only 
people‘s actions but also of how they think; ―the differences between, for example, 
callousness and sensitivity, insightfulness and obtuseness, reasonableness and 
perversity, fair-mindedness and prejudice, self-deception and self-criticism, wisdom 
and fanaticism.‖68 Thinking of morality in this expanded form acknowledges the 
inner struggle that underlies moral decision-making, for the action upon which we 
eventually settle does not capture this internal conflict. Bigotry, selfishness, 
callousness, willful ignorance, and the like are normal human predicaments, and we 
constantly struggle against yielding to these temptations. Yet, our ability to resist 
temptation is a crucial determinant of our actions and an indicator of the quality of 
our characters. Cook argues that if we come to think seriously about our inner 
struggles to resist temptation, it would become obvious that these inner struggles are 
at the core of morality.69 How we think about moral matters, the evaluations and 
discernments we make, is the essence of morality.  
Cook‘s account of morality prioritizes thoughts over actions—a view that finds 
support in Iris Murdoch, Oxford University philosophy professor and novelist. For 
Murdoch, the concern of morality is essentially with change and progress,70 which 
means a person‘s capacity for insight. Murdock holds that because all people do not 
possess the same degree of insight and understanding, all moral views do not hold 
equal weight.71 In other words, that a particular conduct is regarded as legitimate by 
a given culture says nothing about its rightness. If true, Murdoch‘s view rejects 
moral relativists‘ claim that all moral views are of equal weight. But her view does 
not seemingly affirm absolutism either.  
If Murdock is right, then, with what are we left? What is the source of dispute 
between opposing moral perspectives? Relativists like Edward Westermarck, Finnish 
sociologist and philosopher, think of moral disagreements in terms of a clash of 
principles; people that share the same principles will invariably arrive at the same 
moral conclusions.72 Cook rejects this notion and argues that where there are 
conflicting claims in relation to a moral matter (such as FGM), the source of the 
conflict is not that the disputants are operating from different moral horizons, but 
that at least one of the opposing parties lacks ―a sufficiently developed moral 
consciousness.‖73 Cook, thus, rejects Westermarck‘s notion that we are all equal in 
our moral reasoning; that, in cases of two conflicting ―moral principles,‖ neither can 
                                                          
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 29 (1971); COOK, supra note 47, at 127. 
 71 MURDOCH, supra note 53, at 17-18; COOK, supra note 65, at 128. 
 72 COOK, supra note 47, at 114; see also EDWARD WESTERMARCK, ETHICAL RELATIVITY 
(1932).  
 73 COOK, supra note 65, at 117. 
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be considered the ―right‖ one since there is no legitimate basis to argue that one 
principle is the result of a ―superior moral consciousness.‖74 As Cook sees it, a 
person lacks a sufficiently developed moral consciousness when he fails to reflect on 
moral matters in an honest and careful way.75 Such people are not morally thoughtful 
or insightful.76 The difference between those who are thoughtful and those who are 
not thoughtful does not arise from a clash of principles; rather, the difference arises 
in the ways that they evaluate moral matters, in ―how earnestly, honestly, and 
diligently they think.‖77   
Regarding FGM, the source of moral conflict has nothing to do with ―different 
moral principles.‖ Instead, the source is a failure on the part of FGM defenders to 
honestly and carefully evaluate morally relevant issues raised by the practice, such as 
the need to seek and obtain consent prior to the procedure. If FGM defenders educate 
themselves and think seriously about the broad implications of the ritual, they would 
come to realize that FGM harms women‘s physical and mental health, and therefore, 
FGM is morally indefensible on that ground alone. They would come to see that, by 
all accounts, the harm suffered by women greatly outweighs the perceived benefits. 
Clearly, thinking critically about the harm that FGM inflicts is the key to changing 
the minds of FGM defenders. But successfully eradicating a centuries-old practice, 
one deeply ingrained in collective psyche as an ineliminable part of cultural identity, 
will not be easy. The difficulty that this will entail is captured by anti-segregationist 
Lillian Smith‘s observation in 1963: ―[i]nsight was not a quality their [Southern 
United States] culture valued; nor intellectual honesty; nor self-criticism; nor human 
rights.‖78 Although Smith was writing about the racist southern United States, her 
account accurately depicts the dominant cultural climate in some FGM societies. It is 
with these societies that we are concerned.  
IV. FGM: AN EVIL OR SOMETHING ELSE? 
FGM can be faulted on multiple grounds. The procedure is usually performed 
under unsanitary, painful, and violent conditions.79 Often the woman is forcibly 
restrained by several people while the operation is performed.80 The women are 
typically not anesthetized, and they do not receive post-operative treatment to cope 
with the physical, emotional, and psychological problems associated with the 
procedure.81 The fact that the vast majority of people that perform the surgery are 
illiterate, and lack basic medical training, is a distinct hazard in itself. Their 
instrument of choice is a razor blade or a knife, many with dull edges and usually 
                                                          
 74 Id. at 116. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 117. 
 78 COOK, supra note 65, at 129 (quoting LILLIAN SMITH, KILLERS OF THE DREAM 47-53 
(1963)). 
 79 See generally Thoraya Obaid, Frequently Asked Questions on Female Genital 
Mutilation/Cutting, http://www.unfpa.org/gender/practices2.htm#8 (last visited Jan. 5, 2012). 
 80 See generally id. 
 81 Se generally id. 
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unsterilized.82 Not surprisingly, the procedure has been linked to immediate and 
long-term physical and psychological health problems, the severity of which is 
dependent upon the type of procedure performed.83 Infibulated women suffer the 
most severe consequences. The following health complications are common: pain; 
trauma; hemorrhage; difficulty urinating; painful menstruation; painful sexual 
interourse (dyspareunia); sexual dysfunction; infections resulting from contaminated 
instruments; an increased risk of HIV transmission due to the use of unsterilized 
instruments; unintended labia fusion; proliferation of scar tissue at the site (keloid); 
and infertility.84 These complications are the major drivers of calls for abolition of 
the ractice. However, there is a growing body of literature that question the accuracy 
of these claims. These recent studies—filled as they are with contradictory 
conclusions—are critical because they have a foundational impact on the entire 
debate regarding the elimination of FGM.85 Nonetheless, let us assume arguendo that 
the consequences claimed to result from the procedure are not controversial. It is 
these consequences that make the procedure amenable to human rights jurisdiction.86 
                                                          
 82 Id 
 83 Id. 
 84 See WHO, supra note 24, at 33-35 (discussing the complications of such procedures); 
see also Nussbaum, supra note 24, at 120.  
 85 See Fuambai S. Ahmadu, Disputing the Myth of the Sexual Dysfunction of Circumcised 
Women, 25 ANTHROPOL. TODAY 14, 15 (2009) (an interview) (arguing that the problem with 
categorizing all forms of FGR as ―mutilation‖ is that the term seems to imply the inevitability 
of some serious and irreversible harm, yet there is no evidence to support such conclusion); 
Linda Morison et al., The Long-Term Reproductive Health Consequences of Female Genital 
Cutting in Rural Gambia: A Community-Based Survey, 6 TROP.  MED. & INT‘L HEALTH. 643, 
651 (2001) (finding that morbidities such as infertility, anemia, damage to the perineum or 
anus, vulval tumors, painful sex, prolapse and so forth have no significant association with 
FGR and cautioning that by ―basing health information on sound data rather than implying 
that severe long-term health consequences are common, activists are likely to make their 
claims more credible to practising communities and therefore more effective‖); Obermeyer, 
supra note 10, at 92 (concluding, following a comprehensive search and retrieval of the 
medical and demographic literature on FGR, including all sources in English or French, that 
―[o]n the basis of the vast literature on the harmful effects of genital surgeries, one might have 
anticipated finding a wealth of studies that document considerable increases in mortality and 
morbidity. This review could find no incontrovertible evidence on mortality, and the rate of 
medical complications suggests that they are the exception rather than the rule. This should be 
cause to ponder, because it suggests a discrepancy between the forceful rhetoric, which 
depicts female genital surgeries as causing death and disease, and the large numbers of women 
who, voluntarily or under pressure, undergo these procedures‖); Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, 
The Health Consequences of Female Circumcision: Science, Advocacy, and Standards of 
Evidence, 17 MED. ANTHROPOL. Q. 394, 394-412 (2003); Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, The 
Consequences of Female Circumcision for Health and Sexuality: An Update on the Evidence, 
7 CULT. HEALTH & SEX. 443, 443-461 (2005) (arguing that while some negative health 
conditions are associated with FGR, for many of those conditions, there is no evidence of 
statistically significant association). 
 86 As used here, the phrase ―amenable to human rights jurisdiction‖ suggests that in 
absence of harmful health hazards, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make 
a compelling case for intervention through the instrumentality of human rights. On the other 
hand, one might argue that the very act itself (FGM), given accompanying pain and suffering, 
constitutes human rights infraction in that it infringes the prohibition against torture, cruel, 
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While the status of FGM as a human rights violation has gained widespread 
acceptance, it is not clear the appropriate moral weight to be attached to the 
procedure. Is FGM a moral wrong, like any other? Or, are there some other 
circumstances worthy of consideration that set it apart from other wrongs? If the 
response to the latter question is affirmative, are the circumstances sufficiently 
reprehensible to warrant calling the procedure evil? These are, by no means, 
insignificant concerns, because whether FGM is classified as evil will influence the 
overall scheme of employing human rights as a tool to redress gendered injustice. As 
to why this is important, feminist philosopher Claudia Card‘s observation is 
poignant: ―evils are of greater importance than mere [wrongs],‖ and therefore, 
―should receive priority of attention.‖87 Card recognizes that we cannot possibly 
attend to all the moral wrongs worthy of our attention, at least not to the same extent 
nor contemporaneously.88 We are constantly confronted with many competing 
demands, but the resources needed to effectively respond to these demands are finite 
because of the limited amount of resources at our disposal. For this reason, Card 
argues that we should attend to real cases of evil before deploying resources to 
eradicate mere moral wrongs.89 Understanding and appreciating the degree of 
suffering that procedures like FGM inflict would steer people to ―choose to do 
something significant to alleviate or prevent them, rather than make relatively 
greater progress with lesser projects.‖90 Instances of such lesser projects would 
include FC and other less invasive forms of FGR. And this brings to the fore the 
need to distinguish FGM from FC: FGM inflicts significantly greater harm and 
suffering than FC and is therefore more deserving of our attention. What, then, is 
evil? 
Card defines evil as ―foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable 
wrongdoing.‖91 Implicit in this definition is that not all harms constitute evil; only 
harms that are intolerable and effectuated in a blameworthy manner would satisfy 
the definition. Therefore, even if an act produces intolerable harm, it would not be 
evil if its occurrence was accidental or the result of a natural event. How, then, are 
evils distinguished from ordinary wrongs? Card explains that a wrong becomes an 
evil when the harm ―(1) [is] reasonably foreseeable (or appreciable); (2) [is] culpably 
                                                          
inhuman, or degrading treatment, as well as the prohibition against all forms of physical and 
mental violence, injury, and maltreatment. See International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 19(1), 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. But 
then, one might respond to this argument by suggesting the adoption of a public health 
approach—that is, efforts should be directed toward enlisting the services of medical 
professionals whose skills and use of anesthesia would nullify the ―pain and suffering‖ 
argument. In which case, there will be no question of violating any of the aforesaid human 
rights and, therefore, the case for human rights involvement would become suspect. [This 
argument is the subject of a forthcoming article.]  
 87 CLAUDIA CARD, THE ATROCITY PARADIGM: A THEORY OF EVIL 97 (2002). 
 88 See generally id. 
 89 Se generally id. 
 90 Id. at 111. 
 91 Id. at 3. 
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inflicted (or tolerated, aggravated, or maintained); and (3) deprives, or seriously risks 
depriving, others of the basics that are necessary to make a life possible and tolerable 
or decent (or to make a death decent).‖92 She cites, as examples of such basics, 
―uncontaminated food, water, and air; sleep; freedom from severe and prolonged 
pain and from debilitating fear; affective ties with other human beings; the ability to 
make choices and act on them; and a sense of one‘s [own] worth as a person.‖93 ―A 
‗tolerable‘ life is one that is at least minimally worth living for its own sake,‖ which 
is judged from the perspective of the person whose life it is, and not as a means to 
the end of others.94 
Evidently, therefore, the distinction between ordinary wrongs and evils lies in the 
nature and severity of the harm.95 While evils tend to ruin lives, ordinary wrongs—
because they are less severe—do not have life-lasting consequences. Regarding 
FGM, opponents claim that in addition to adverse health complications, the 
procedure damages relationships. Women who have undergone the procedure lose 
the capacity to fully enjoy sexual relationships.96 And because of the irreversible 
nature of the procedure, such women are doomed to a life of unfulfilled sexual 
desires.97 This could lead to divorce or, for unmarried couples, estrangement. 
According to a study conducted in Sudan that surveyed the preferences of men 
married to infibulated women, an overwhelming majority of the respondents 
expressed a sexual preference for non-infibulated women.98 Some of the men 
surveyed married a second wife owing the remarriage to penetration difficulties 
encountered with their first wives.99 Thus, the scar of FGM is not transient; rather, it 
is a life-long perpetual denial of affected women‘s human right to sexual freedom, 
an encounter with the face of evil. 
                                                          
 92 Id. at 16. 
 93 Id. (emphasis added). The ability to make choices is innate to humanity and, depending 
on the nature of the subject, an unjustifiable attempt to limit the exercise thereof could rise to 
the level of evil. It is precisely because girls and women in most FGM societies are denied this 
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 95 Id. at 3. 
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Impact, 27 J. Sex Marital Ther. 471, 471-72 (2001). 
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 99 Althaus, supra note 12 (citing A. A. Shandall, supra note 98, at 178-212). 
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Moral wrong is different. For example, falsely accusing a fellow student of 
seeking favors from a professor, will not likely impact the life of the falsely accused 
student in any significantly damaging manner; thus, it, does not rise to the level of 
what can be appropriately termed evil. To be evil, the wrongdoing must be serious; it 
must be of such a character that reasonable people would agree that the damage it 
inflicts crosses the threshold of the sort that we would ascribe to the harm suffered 
by the student whose reputation was unfairly maligned. Does this account support 
the claim by Omoigui and Nwabuzor that it is a stretch to classify FC or removal of 
clitoral prepuce as the same as FGM? Recall that their argument was based on the 
fact that the two procedures and their consequences are starkly different; 
specifically, that the painful nature of FGM as well as its attendant risks, are 
conspicuously absent in FC.100 The implication is that if, as the two authors argue, 
FC clitoridotomy, not clitoridectomy) is anatomically equivalent to male 
circumcision, then it becomes difficult to group it with true cases of FGM.101 
Circumcised males throughout the ages have lived normal and fulfilling lives and 
have not suffered any of the consequences associated with FGM. Because there is no 
evidence that the lives of circumcised men became intolerable as a consequence of 
having lost penile prepuces (foreskin), it is reasonable to assume that circumcised 
females would be similarly situated. Therefore, though it may be a moral wrong, we 
cannot label as evil subjecting non-consenting women to a clitoridotomy unless we 
are prepared to also ascribe evil to male circumcision. 
What about real cases of FGM: clitoridectomy, excision, and infibulation? Are 
they, like FC and other less invasive forms of FGR, ordinary wrongs? Clearly, they 
are not. Rather, they fall within Card‘s definition of evil.102 The harm inflicted, 
namely, the health and psychological suffering enumerated previously, was the 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the procedure. And this is the critical point of 
departure that enables us to conclude that FC is not evil and yet hold differently with 
respect to FGM. Although most perpetrators of FGM are illiterate, and thus, might 
not understand the full ramifications of their actions, the validity of such a claim is 
becoming increasingly tenuous given the large-scale dissemination of such 
information. Moreover, if they are truly ignorant, it behooves them to seek 
information, oral would suffice, about the possible consequences of their actions. 
Further evidence of culpability is provided by human rights. Women, unarguably, 
possess an inherent right to health (including sexual and reproductive health). 
Although there may be no positive obligation on a third-party to ensure that their 
right to health is realized, there is certainly an obligation on everyone to refrain from 
obstructing the enjoyment of their right.103  Because FGM seriously compromises the 
                                                          
 100 See supra notes 35-41. 
 101 Omoigui, supra note 35. 
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health of girls and women, perpetrators, like anyone else that interferes with 
actualization of human rights, are morally and legally culpable. 
As is often the case with controversial subjects, there has not been a dearth of 
possible solutions to the challenges posed by FGM. Suggestions have been made to 
redirect our efforts toward education.104 Scholars theorize that since even women in 
FGM societies disagree about the propriety of the procedure, perhaps a compromise 
would be to make the procedure elective.105 According to this view, the procedure 
would be performed only on consenting adults. This compromise is a sensible 
suggestion, but it raises the question whether such consent makes the ritual any less 
evil. Does consent negate evil? Does FGM cease to be evil simply because the 
victim is a consenting adult? For some, the answer is yes. Nineteenth century British 
philosopher John Stuart Mill, for instance, holds that self-regarding harms (harm to 
oneself) ―are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, 
do not constitute wickedness.‖106 Such acts may be foolish or evidence of a lack of 
self-respect, Mill argues, ―but so long as they do not constitute harm to others, they 
are not immoral.‖107 ―[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.‖108 
Under Mill‘s view, individual autonomy that does not harm others does not 
warrant moral condemnation. As autonomous entities, human beings are entitled to 
engage in actions that they consider promotive of their interests, without interference 
by a third party, provided that their actions do not negatively impact others‘ interests. 
But, as Cook forcefully argues, moral judgment is not limited to an assessment of 
human actions; rather it must extend to the way people think: ―[W]e must assign 
priority to moral assessments of how we think about matters and how we perceive 
and represent them to ourselves; moral assessments of actions must take second 
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Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001) 
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 104 See Female Genital Mutilation: A Matter of Human Rights: An Advocate’s Guide 
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 106 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 51 (John Gray ed., 1998); see 
also CARD, supra note 87, at 19.  
 107 MILL, supra note 106, at 51. 
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place.‖109 In this sense, lacking self-respect is not a private matter. According to 
Cook, exhibiting a lack of self-respect provides a measure of one‘s morality.110 Thus, 
Card was right: since self-respect provides a moral basis for change, it follows that 
its absence must provide a basis for moral indignation.111 The consequences of 
condoning disrespectful treatment does not end with the person disrespected. A 
woman in a violent relationship, who subjects herself to prolonged abuse at the 
hands of a spouse or partner, is inflicting evil not only upon herself, but also upon 
others. By not demanding respectful and humane treatment, she legitimizes (albeit 
unwittingly) domestic violence—a weapon of gender subjugation.112 The implicit 
message her behavior sends to women in abusive relationships is one of affirmation 
that violence and cruelty against women should be tolerated. No reasonable person 
would desire such a result, and the negativity such posture connotes makes it a 
morally imprudent course of action. 
This principle—to forbear from a conduct on the ground that non forbearance 
would lead others to do wrong—has a strong foundation in Christian ethics. Writing 
at about 56-57 A.D., the apostle Paul summed up the doctrinal position on the 
propriety of eating foods sacrificed to idols: ―[a]ll food is clean, but it is wrong for a 
person to eat anything that causes someone else to stumble.‖113 In other words, while 
a Christian is at liberty to eat whatever she likes, the liberty is not absolute. She is 
forbidden to exercise the right where doing so would lead another to sin. Liberty or 
not, ―[i]t is better not to . . . do anything else that will cause your brother or sister to 
fall.‖114 As to how precisely the consumption of food offered to idols by one 
Christian would lead another to sin, Paul offers this explanation: ―[f]or if someone 
with a weak conscience sees you, with all your knowledge, eating in an idol‘s 
temple, won‘t that person be emboldened to eat what is sacrificed to idols?‖115 This 
Christian adjuration presents an appropriate prism from which to examine the claim 
that consent to FGM somehow negates the moral stigma attached to the procedure. 
Applying Paul‘s injunction to FGM might yield the following gospel: by consenting 
to the procedure, for whatever reason, the woman implicitly lends legitimacy to a 
conduct that is inherently immoral, and this, in itself, is evil. 
But this postulation—that forbearance, for the sake of self-respect and out of 
concern for possible effects on third-parties, is the appropriate course of conduct—
does not end the inquiry. There is no consensus that forbearance is always the right 
action to take. As a result, the idea should be understood as one of the ways to attend 
to an ethical dilemma and not, in any sense, as a way to dispose of the matter. To 
hold otherwise would be tantamount to prioritizing the right of the ―other‖ or the 
community over that of the individual whose interest is primarily at stake. This is not 
to suggest, however, that such tradeoffs are never appropriate. Rather, the point is 
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that such circumstances are rare. Instances where such trade-offs have been 
appropriate are usually exceptional cases, and, even in those limited cases, they are 
typically problematic.116  
Insight into the locus of forbearance and non forbearance in moral decision-
making can be gleaned from the evolution of bioethics as an independent discipline. 
In terms of advancing human well-being and its unwavering commitment to patient 
autonomy, the evolution of bioethics is extolled as one of the most remarkable 
events of the last century. As scholars from such disparate backgrounds as 
philosophy, medicine, theology, and law converged to explore the foundations and 
contours of the new subject, it soon became obvious that the era of benign 
paternalism—by which physicians independently determined what was in the best 
interest of patients—must give way to something better.117 Albert Jonsen, Emeritus 
Professor of Ethics in Medicine, notes that they settled on ―a principle unfamiliar to 
traditional medical ethics but familiar to philosophers: the freedom of persons to 
judge what is in their benefit without interference from others.‖118 Just as belief in a 
supreme God, at least in monotheistic traditions, is at the core of moral theology, 
patient autonomy is the foundation of bioethics. Individual autonomy is the altar at 
which seekers of bioethical wisdom and guidance must manifest obeisance.119 But, 
autonomy is not only a moral principle; it is also a human right.120 Therefore, 
autonomy may be invoked by anyone, whether patients in hospitals or women 
seeking fulfillment in ways that appear to others to be unfamiliar or, perhaps, even 
strange. How is demanding forbearance from women intent on partaking in a revered 
cultural rite different from paternalism—a deficiency in patient well-being that was 
the impetus for the emergence of bioethics in the corpus of organized academic 
disciplines? There does not appear to be any difference.  
For women interested in this rite of passage, the appropriate moral direction 
might be the ancient catechism: ―let your conscience be your guide.‖ This returns us 
full circle to Mill‘s argument that self-regarding harms are not an appropriate subject 
for moral criticism.121 To do otherwise, Mill argues, is a serious infraction on 
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individual autonomy—the most important of all fundamental rights.122 Although 
originating from an unrelated context, the plea of Patrick Henry, one of the most 
influential of the founding fathers of the United States, is particularly compelling: 
―Liberty the greatest of all earthly blessings—give us that precious jewel, and you 
may take everything else.‖123 The liberty to independently direct one‘s own actions 
makes it possible for human beings to be valued, in the Kantian sense, as ends in 
themselves, and not merely as means to another‘s end.124 And this is so whether the 
subject is collective or individually-directed courses of action, or in the political 
realm or one‘s private life.  
Liberty is the foundation of all human rights, the fountain from which other 
human rights draw nourishment. When we say that a person has a right to this or 
that, we mean, in essence, that the person has liberty to do anything he chooses. For 
instance, a right to health means that one has liberty to do all that is necessary to 
ensure optimal health. Regarding individuals asserting their autonomy, the only 
question one needs to ask is whether the individual is sufficiently competent. Has the 
agency, rationality, or independence of the individual been compromised in any 
discernible way? Where expectations to comply with societal mores are great, 
external influences might weaken independent action so that seemingly freely 
expressed ―consent‖ is, in reality, coerced.125 But the influence of coercion on 
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accept something (even if harmful to him or her) as normal. See generally Daniel Little, False 
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id. The following account is illustrative:   
Because traditional patrilineal communities assign women a subordinate role, women 
feel unable to oppose community dictates even when those affect them adversely. 
Many women even go to great lengths to support those dictates by organizing groups 
which mete out punishment to nonconforming women, and conduct hostile campaigns 
against passive observers. Women championing many of the cultural practices 
adopted by their communities do not realize that some of the practices they promote 
were designed to subjugate them, and more importantly, to control their sexuality and 
to maintain male chauvinistic attitudes in respect to marital and sexual relations. Most 
African women have still not developed the sensitivity to feel deprived or to see in 
many cultural practices a violation of their human rights. The consequence of this is 
that, in the mid-1980s when most women in Africa have voting rights and can 
influence political decisions against practices harmful to their health, they continue to 
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individual autonomy should not be overplayed. There are many situations in which 
community expectation subtly coerces an individual to act differently than he would 
have chosen, yet the action is not condemned. For example, a parent with many 
children who is able to provide for his family through extraordinary means receives 
no moral condemnation, even though the parent‘s perceived need to avoid 
denunciation by his community may have strongly motivated his conduct. It follows 
then that where a fully-informed, competent woman decides in favor of the benefits 
and voluntarily submits to the FGM, it would be difficult to find her blameworthy. 
V. SOME ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
There are at least two principal ethical issues that are of concern regarding FGM: 
first, harmful health complications awaiting women who have been subjected to the 
procedure; and second, the non-consensual nature of the procedure. Non-consensual 
FGM occurs when girls lack capacity to give informed consent and when women are 
forced to undergo the procedure against their will. The right to bodily integrity is not 
only a legal precept, but it is also an ethical prescription that forbids anyone from 
invading another‘s bodily space without permission.126 The protection offered by this 
right, as explained by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in 1914, is all-encompassing: 
―Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without 
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his patient‘s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.‖127 The 
two principal ethical issues noted above—health and non-consent—are incompatible 
with the human rights principle articulated by Justice Cardozo. Law, as well as 
ethics, prescribe that permission must be sought and obtained before performing any 
medical procedure on an individual, regardless of the type of procedure.
128
 Whether 
performed by traditional practitioners, midwives, or physicians, FGM is a medical 
procedure. Therefore, FGM is subject to the rules and principles of medical ethics. 
The ethical principle of non-maleficence is directly related to the first concern. 
The principle requires health professionals to ―first, do no harm,‖ primum non 
nocere.129 This is an absolute obligation, from which no derogation is permitted. 
Although the harmfulness of FGM remains mired in controversy, there is little 
disagreement that some harm is involved. On the basis of fidelity to non-
maleficence, therefore, health professions must refrain from lending their skills and 
service to the performance of FGM. Many professional medical organizations have 
issued statements emphasizing respect for this obligation. The General Assembly of 
the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics, for instance, is 
cognizant ―that [FGM] is a violation of human rights, as a harmful procedure 
performed on a child who cannot give informed consent‖ and urges gynecologists 
and obstetricians to ―oppose any attempt to medicalize the procedure or to allow its 
performance, under any circumstances, in health establishments or by health 
professionals.‖130 The second relevant principle is beneficence, defined as ―a moral 
obligation to act for the benefit of others.‖131 This is a broad concept and includes 
virtues such as mercy, kindness, altruism and love.132 As an action-guiding norm, 
beneficence requires genuine demonstration of empathy toward the suffering of 
others, including girls and women at the risk of FGM.133 
Closely related to beneficence, though itself an independent moral theory that 
most profoundly speaks to FGM, is care ethics. Compared to more established moral 
traditions, care ethics is still evolving. Its evolution originated from feminist 
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psychologist Carol Gilligan‘s seminal 1982 book and subsequent writings, and has 
since been expounded by a litany of other commentators, feminists, and non-
feminists alike.134 Gilligan‘s thesis was that the moral horizons of men and women 
differ significantly.  Whereas men tend to think in terms of reason and rules, women 
exhibit more nuanced ways of thinking, prioritizing caring and relationships.135 
Gilligan‘s findings compartmentalized ethics into two distinct blocks.136 The first is 
ethics of justice, which is detached, abstract reasoning based on objective rules, 
duties, and obligations.137 The second is ethics of care, which is marked by 
relationships and characterized by emotions and sentiments.138 At the core of care 
ethics is the importance of relationships: affinity, community, and togetherness, or, 
as made more explicit by Alisa Carse, Georegetown University professor of 
philosophy, ―a concern for the good of others and of community with them, of a 
capacity for imaginative projection into the position of others, and of situation-
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emphasizes individual rights while care ethics emphasizes communal relationships; (d) justice 
ethics works best in the public realm, whereas care ethics works best in the private realm; (e) 
justice ethics stresses the role of reason in performing right actions while care ethics stresses 
the role of emotions in constituting good character; and (f) justice ethics is male or masculinist 
while care ethics is female or feminist‖).  
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attuned responses to others' needs.‖139 These are core values, and a gross deficiency 
in them diminishes one‘s moral standing. Care ethics judges the rightness of an 
action as well as the goodness of the action‘s agent; under the theory, the two are 
inseparable. 
A distinctive feature of care ethics is its emphasis on relationships and the nature 
of their resulting moral obligation: benevolence, empathy, and compassion, each 
borne out of a sense of interdependence and interconnectedness.140 The thrust of care 
ethics is that ―we are [all] in it together.‖141 This togetherness is breached when we 
unjustifiably detach ourselves from others who need our help. The level of 
blameworthiness for unjustifiable detachment rises or falls in tandem with the 
proximity of the relationship. For example, apathy toward the well-being of one‘s 
child is more egregious than when the ―other‖ is a colleague at work. Vulnerability 
foists a special demand on us to act. As a matter of moral responsibility, the unfairly 
disadvantaged deserve priority over those not similarly situated. The temptation to 
remain ambivalent in the face of injustice is replaced by a call to action, to the rescue 
of the weaker party. 
Does care ethics provide moral instructions for FGM? Certainly, the response 
must be affirmative. Recall that FGM involves people in very close relationships.142 
Girls and women undergo the procedure with the full knowledge and active support 
of their parents, uncles, aunts, and so forth—all of whom perceive themselves as 
standing in solidarity with members of their family as they celebrate a treasured 
cultural rite.143 The paradox here is the gulf between intent and reality. Regarding 
intent, families encourage or force their daughters and sisters to undergo the 
procedure believing that their action will promote the best interest of their loved one. 
The reality is that the procedure involves a real risk of more harm than good. In this 
seemingly confused state, the standard articulated by Professor James Rachels, 
philosopher and medical ethicist, seems instructive. Referring to controversial social 
practices, Professor Rachels recommends the following evaluative process:  
Does the practice promote or hinder the welfare of people whose lives are 
[most] affected by it? And, as a corollary, we may ask if there is an 
alternative set of social arrangements that would do a better job of 
promoting their welfare. If there is any, we may conclude that the existing 
practice is deficient.144  
Based on the negative consequences flowing from FGM, the response to the first 
question is that FGM hinders welfare. As to the second question, alternative rites of 
passage that involve no cutting would better promote welfare.145 For instance, in 
                                                          
 139 Alisa L. Carse, The “Voice of Care”: Implications for Bioethical Education, 16 J. MED. 
& PHIL. 5, 18 (1991). 
 140 See Tong, supra note 134, at 148 (suggesting that without these virtues, true human 
community and bona-fide relations cannot evolve). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Jo-Ann and David Jones, supra note 14. 
 143 See id. 
 144 Rachels, supra note 61, at 128. 
 145 See Chi Mgbako et al., Penetrating the Silence in Sierra Leone: A Blueprint for the 
Eradication of Female Genital Mutilation, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 111, 131-134 (2010) 
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Kenya, an alternative rite of passage known as Ntanira na Mugambo or 
―Circumcision through Words‖ has been practiced since 1996.146 After a weeklong 
counseling program on family and role of women, there is a community celebration 
of singing, dancing, and feasting to affirm young girls‘ transition into adulthood.147 
Ntanira na Mugambo retains all aspects of Kenyan traditional FGR, except cutting. 
VI. HUMAN RIGHTS PROHIBITIONS: ARE THEY SUFFICIENTLY ANTIDOTAL OR 
WARRANTED IN ALL CASES?  
Initially, among those pushing for the eradication of FGM, the rallying cry was 
the procedure‘s adverse health consequences. The idea was that highlighting the 
physiological and psychosocial harm resulting from the procedure would arouse 
sufficient public outcry and galvanize efforts toward its elimination. This idea, 
however, generated unintended consequences. Instead of seeking the services of 
traditional cutters—maligned for using crude instruments, for operating in unsanitary 
conditions, and for their inability to manage complications resulting from the 
operation—parents and family members of girls and women due for the procedure 
began enlisting the services of qualified medical personnel. This led to the evolution 
of the ―medicalization‖ argument,148 which argues that merely shifting the location 
                                                          
(discussing steps that could yield a successful transition to alternative rites in FGR 
communities, including the need to: precede the introduction of the alternative rites with 
educational workshops on the negative consequences of FGR; consult and integrate 
community members that perform the procedure into the project; and, select the type of 
alternative ritual that would be satisfactory to new initiates and the community). 
 146 Chelala Cesar, An Alternative Way to Stop Female Genital Mutilation, 352 LANCET 
126 (1998). 
 147 Jane Njeri Chege et al., An Assessment of the Alternative Rites Approach for 
Encouraging Abandonment of Female Genital Mutilation in Kenya, FRONTIERS IN 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 4-5 (2001), http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/frontiers/FR_FinalRep 
orts/Kenya_FGC.pdf; Malik Stan Reaves, Kenya: Alternative Rite to Female Circumcision 
Spreading in Kenya, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 19, 1997), http://allafrica.com/stories/20 
0101080370.html. But whether programs such as these, that seek to attain the same goal as 
FGM while sparing young girls the horror of cutting, have staying power remains to be seen. 
As a government official remarked during a recent celebration, ―You cannot change Culture 
overnight.‖ Id. Troublingly, a report by the human rights group ―Equality Now‖ shows that 
despite availability of harmless rites such as Ntanira na Mugambo, FGM is still on the rise in 
the country. See Equality Now, KENYA: Female Genital Mutilation Cases Rise, CHILD 
RIGHTS INFORMATION NETWORK (Dec. 28, 2007), http://www.crin.org/violence/search/ 
closeup.asp?infoID=15918.   
 148 ―Medicalization‖ (of FGR) means employing suitably qualified health professionals to 
perform the procedure. See JEANNE WARD ET AL., BROKEN BODIES - BROKEN DREAMS: 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN EXPOSED 52 (2005); Gemma Richardson, Ending Female 
Genital Mutilation?: Rights, Medicalization, and the State of Ongoing Struggles to Eliminate 
the FGM in Kenya, THE DOMINION (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.dominionpaper.ca/accounts/ 
2005/02/11/ending_fem.html. Remarkably, this approach is similar to the rationale behind 
decriminalizing abortion (that is, access to physicians would reduce mortality and other health 
complications resulting from back alley abortions). See id. But medicalization has been 
discredited as legitimizing FGR, in that the end result would be making FGR safer as opposed 
to putting an end to it—the professed goal of anti-FGR efforts. See id. The need to plug this 
deficiency was the rationale for the current framework; that is, a human rights approach that 
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of the operation to hospitals and clinics does not wash away the sins of FGM; rather, 
regardless of who performs the procedure or where it is performed, FGM is wrong 
and must be abolished. This argument led to the emergence of the human rights 
approach as a more productive framework. 
A rights-based approach is predicated on the human-rights‘ principle that the 
protection of human well-being, in all its dimensions, is accomplished not just by 
condemning conduct inimical to this objective, but by also holding perpetrators 
accountable. Several aspects of the wellbeing of women and children are violated by 
FGM and this is manifested in a plethora of human rights instruments, some more 
narrowly focused than others. Foremost amongst these instruments are the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)149 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).150 In addition to 
the omnibus prohibition of discrimination against women, State Parties to CEDAW 
(currently 187)
151
 specifically undertake to ―take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs, and practices 
which constitute discrimination against women.‖152 Because FGM is exclusively 
performed on women, it is prima facie discriminatory. Further, because the 
procedure is embedded in the culture of affected communities, its eradication is 
clearly mandated by this provision. This obligation is made more concrete in Article 
5 of CEDAW, which requires ―social and cultural‖ practices to be modified ―with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices‖ based on gender-related stereotyping or subjugation.153 The CRC, on the 
other hand, requires State Parties to ―take all effective and appropriate measures with 
a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.‖154 
Furthermore, Article 19(1) of the CRC imposes an obligation on State Parties to 
protect children from all forms of violence, injury, abuse, or maltreatment.155  
Africa—the region with the highest FGM prevalence—has its own regional 
framework. Two treaties are particularly relevant: the Protocol to the African Charter 
                                                          
focuses on breach of individual rights resulting from the procedure and not solely on health 
concerns. See id. 
 149 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 
1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].   
 150 CRC, supra note 86, at art. 19(1). The Convention on the Rights of the Child was 
acclaimed as the most widely ratified human treaty, with a total of 193 countries as of July 
2010. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD‘S CHILDREN: SPECIAL EDITION ii 2 (2009); 
U.N. Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child, (June 24, 2010), 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV11&chapter=4&la
ng=en. Only the United States and Somalia are yet to ratify the CRC though both countries 
signed the treaty. 
 151 See Chapter IV: Human Rights, CEDAW (Jan. 21, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/Pag 
es/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (listing the 
State Parties to the treaty).  
 152 CEDAW, supra note 151, at art. 2(f). 
 153 CEDAW, supra note 151, at art. 5(a). 
 154 CEDAW, supra note 151, at art. 24(3). 
 155 CRC, supra note 86, at art. 19(1). 
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on Human and Peoples‘ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo 
Protocol)156 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC).157 Among human rights treaties dealing with FGM, the Maputo Protocol 
may be described as a pace-setter; it was the first international treaty to make explicit 
reference to FGM: ―[A]ll forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, 
medicalization, and para-medicalization of female genital mutilation‖ shall be 
prohibited in member countries through the adoption of appropriate legislative and 
other measures.158 Like CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol obligates State Parties to 
combat all forms of discrimination against women by enacting appropriate 
legislative, institutional, and other appropriate measures.
159
  
The ACRWC, on the other hand, prohibits the practice of any custom, tradition, 
culture, or religion ―that is inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations 
contained in the . . .  Charter;‖ it stipulates that such practices ―shall to the extent of 
such inconsistency be discouraged.‖160 The ACRWC explicitly states that decisions 
or actions by any person or authority concerning the child shall be judged by 
whether such decision or action is promotive of the best interest of the child.161 The 
implication, then, is that since FGM is harmful to children,162 the practice runs afoul 
of the ―best interest of the child‖ principle. Therefore, regardless of semantics, FGM-
practicing nations who are parties to the ACRWC could be subjected to sanctions for 
failing to meet their obligation under the treaty.  
Discrimination aside, those clamoring for abolition point out that FGM violates 
affected children‘s and women‘s right to health, life, liberty, and security163—all of 
which are protected by a battery of international human rights norms. FGM is a 
violation of the right to ―the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health,‖164 not only due to associated health complications, but also because it 
                                                          
 156 Adopted at the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Maputo, 
July 11, 2003, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, reprinted in 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L. J. 40, (entered 
into force Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Maputo Protocol]. 
 157 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), Nov. 29, 1999, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 [hereinafter ACRWC].   
 158 Maputo Protocal, supra note 156, art. 5(b). 
 159 ACRWC, supra note 157, art. 2. 
 160 ACRWC, supra note 157, art. 1(3). 
 161 ACRWC, supra note 157, art. 4(1). 
 162 See Maputo Protocol, supra note 156, art. 1(g) (defining ―harmful practices‖ to include 
―all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of 
women and girls, such as their right to life, health, dignity, education, and physical integrity‖). 
 163 WHO, supra note 24, at 9; see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 24, at 120. 
 164 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 12, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. (No. 16) at 
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICESCR]; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), adopted Dec. 10, 1948; International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5 (e)(iv), G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969); CEDAW, supra note 151, art(s) 11(1)(f), 12; CRC, supra note 86, art. 24; 
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violates the right ―to control one‘s health and body, including sexual and 
reproductive freedom.‖165 The procedure could lead to death, thereby breaching the 
obligation of States to respect and promote the right to life.
166
  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognizes the 
right to liberty and security of the person and forbids State Parties from restricting 
these rights, except in accordance with the law.167 Liberty connotes freedom to make 
decisions or choose actions that maximize individual preferences, and security 
means non-interference with freely made decisions or chosen actions. When forced 
or performed on children, FGM violates these rights. The procedure is also inhuman 
and degrades those upon whom it is forced. Still, protection against inhumane and 
degrading treatment168 is provided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,169 
the ICCPR170 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.171 Regardless of the sporadic nature of States‘ 
compliance, the importance of these treaties lies in their norm-setting standards, as a 
                                                          
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, art(s) 28, 43(1)(e), 45(1)(c), 70, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990) (entered into force July 1, 2003); 
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, art. 16, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986; Maputo 
Protocol, supra note 156, at art. 14; ACRWC, supra note 157, at art. 14. 
 165 See General Comment No. 14, supra note 103, ¶8.  
 166 See ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 6. 
 167 Id. at art. 9.   
 168 The term ―inhuman and degrading‖ treatment is not defined by CEDAW nor any related 
treaty. But the European Court of Human Rights (in relation to Art. 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment) provides some guidance. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Jan. 18, 
1978, Series A No. 25, p. 66 ¶167; Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgment of July 7, 1989, 
Series A No. 161, p. 39, ¶100; see also Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Apr. 25, 1978, 
Series A No. 26, p. 14-15, ¶29-30; GILLES DUTERTRE, KEY CASE-LAW EXTRACTS: 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 57 (2003). To constitute ―inhuman‖ treatment, the 
court must consider the action being challenged to have caused ―if not actual bodily injury, at 
least intense physical and mental suffering.‖ See id. ―Degrading‖ treatment, on the other hand, 
must generate feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority resulting in humiliating or debasing the 
moral worth of its victims. See id. 
 169 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 164, at art. 5. 
 170 Id. at art. 7. 
 171 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46 art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 
1987. Section one of Article 16 states: 
(1) Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction 
other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity. 
 
Id. 
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basis for condemning or upholding conducts perpetrated or sanctioned by national 
authorities.172 For instance, in its consideration of the latest periodic report by Sudan, 
the Human Rights Committee, the implementing body of the ICCPR, noted that 
despite the country‘s efforts to criminalize FGM, the most serious form 
(infibulation) still runs rampant.173 The Committee urged Sudan to enact legislation 
prohibiting FGM and to ensure that perpetrators are punished.174   
The transformation of the anti-FGM approach from health-based to human 
rights-based was not driven solely by pragmatic considerations. The transition to a 
human rights framework also has a moral undertone. Underlying the framework are 
the cherished liberal principles of individual liberty and human (gender) equality.175 
These principles are universal values shared by all humanity—a universality that is 
transgressed by the imposition of FGM on children and ―others incapable of 
providing autonomously given consent.‖176 But what about lucid adult women who 
opt for FGM, such as women in Kono and Sierra Leone?177 Are these women liable 
                                                          
 172 Submission of reports required by various human rights treaty monitoring bodies is ipso 
facto a good faith demonstration by State Parties of their desire for recognition as being in 
compliance with their treaty obligations. In this way, even countries with a poor human rights 
record, and countries perennially condemned for deficits in their legal and policy frameworks, 
would slowly improve their performance. This is significant for it will certainly contribute to 
the advancement of human rights and other rules of international law. 
 173 U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: The Sudan, Aug. 29, 2007, CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, ¶15. 
 174 See id.; see also U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: Uganda, Oct. 4-22, 2010, CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7, ¶¶21-22 (criticizing Uganda, 
while extolling the country for promulgating the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act 
5 (2010), for the continued prevalence of the practice and recommending intensifying its 
awareness-raising and education strategy in addition to enlisting the support and coordinated 
action of civil society and religious organizations in stamping out the practice). 
 175 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Relativism, Universalism, and Applied Ethics: The Case of 
Female Circumcision, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 91, 92 (2007). 
 176 COOK ET AL., supra note 1, at 271. 
 177 Fuambai Ahmadu, an associate professor of Comparative Human Development at the 
University of Chicago, has written extensively on this subject. A Pro-FGR (she herself was 
circumcised according to Kono rites at the age of twenty-two), her observation challenges 
popular belief:  
 So, contrary to much of the rhetoric of the anti-FGM campaigns, the female sex and 
female sexuality are not oppressed in, through or by these ritual practices. On the 
contrary, female sexuality and reproductive powers are celebrated and reified in the 
masquerades, as the origins of creation, of nature and of culture, and feared as potent 
weapons of death and destruction. This cultural and symbolic context of female initiation 
and excision explains how it could be that Kono girls and women [speak] in positive, 
almost reverential terms, about the practice, their bodies and the experience of 
womanhood.  
Ahmadu, supra note 85, at 14-15; see also Fuambai S. Ahmadu, Rites and Wrongs: An 
Insider/Outside Reflects on Power and Excision, in FEMALE ―CIRCUMCISION‖ IN AFRICA: 
CULTURE, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE 283-311 (Ylva Hernlund & Bettina Shell-Duncan 
eds., 2000); Fuambai S. Ahmadu, Hurray for Bondo Women in Kailahun, THE PATRIOTIC 
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in much the way as others who were coerced? Does consent matter? If consent is of 
any significance (a view defended below), then it must represent a cogent reason for 
decoupling the two situations in ethical and legal discourse. But this decoupling is 
conspicuously absent in virtually all the regional and international treaties dealing 
with FGM.   
The same result is obtained in national anti-FGM legislation. This confusion is 
best represented by Ghana‘s attempt to criminalize FGM. Ghana‘s statute178 assigns 
the same punishment to consensual and non-consensual FGM:  
 
Section 69A  
(1) Whoever excises, infibulates or otherwise mutilates the whole or any 
part of the labia minora, labia majora, and the clitoris of another person 
commits an offence and shall be guilty of a second degree felony and 
liable on conviction to imprisonment of not less than three years. 
(2) For the purposes of this section ―excise‖ means to remove the prepuce, 
the clitoris, and all or part of the labia minora; ―infibulate‖ includes 
excision and the additional removal of the labia majora.
179
  
This unnecessary conflation is troubling. Laws proscribing FGM must draw a clear 
distinction between forced and voluntary procedures, and the distinctions must 
determine the severity of sanctions.180 In other words, in respect to those who 
voluntarily submit to the procedure, there should be no punishment whatsoever.181  
Failure to make this distinction is a serious deficiency, one that touches upon the 
very foundation of human rights. Since there is no legitimate reason to punish 
voluntary FGM, treaties and criminal codes purporting to do so violate the human 
right of rational adults to effectuate autonomous choices regarding their most prized 
possession: their bodies. The French Parliamentarians, in 1789, conceived of 
individual liberty as consisting ―in the freedom to do everything which injures no 
one else,‖ stressing that ―the exercise of the natural rights of each man [and woman] 
ha[ve] no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the 
enjoyment of the same rights.‖182 The ambit of this liberty is sufficiently broad to 
                                                          
VANGUARD (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/article.php3?id_article= 
2434.  
 178 Ghana‘s statute was enacted Aug. 4, 1998. The state is an Act (484 of 1994) to amend 
the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) to include in the Code the Offence of Female Circumcisions 
and for Connected Purposes.   
 179 The Act amended Ghana‘s Criminal Code by inserting a new provision: § 69A.  
 180 Other countries with national legislation outlawing FGR are Burkina Faso, Central 
African Republic, Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania, and Togo. In 
Nigeria, there is no national prohibition of the practice, but at least five states have enacted 
such legislation. See Abiodun Raufu, Nigeria Recommends Jail Terms to Eradicate Female 
Genital Mutilation, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1056 (2002). 
 181 See COOK ET AL., supra note 1, at 272 (arguing against parental right to have their 
daughters cut, but holding that such right belongs to the girls themselves who could exercise 
them once of age and intellectually capable of making such decisions). 
 182 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens, J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANCAISE art. 4 (Aug. 26, 1789). 
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shield from the long arms of the law women who voluntarily embrace FGM. To 
punish conduct that is non-coercive and harms no third party is surely an infraction 
on liberty and an affront to the pluralistic ideals of liberal democracy.  
The existence of positive law coercing action or inaction should not confuse us. 
Such law does not mean much, for it says nothing about the rightness or wrongness 
of the conduct proscribed. And, even if enforced, the enforcement does not ipso 
facto legitimize laws that lack a moral justification.183 A philosophy professor once 
                                                          
 183 This sort of conflict (arising from awareness of each individual‘s civic duty to comply 
with a duly enacted law, and yet being restrained from compliance by knowledge that the law 
lacks moral foundation) is most evident in emerging democracies and dictatorships in third 
world countries. It is common knowledge that governments in these countries quite often 
subscribe to international agreements to appease foreign powers, upon which many of them 
especially poorer ones, rely for economic survival—not, as one would expect, out of 
internally-generated or home-grown desire to cure some mischief or remedy some defects in 
their domestic legal frameworks. The aphorism ―he who pays the piper dictates the tune‖ is no 
truer than in international relations. The African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, for 
instance, is generally considered historic for being the only human rights treaty to recognize 
the three genres of rights. See Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The Forgotten Peoples?, 
AFRICAN COMM‘N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES‘ RIGHTS & INT‘L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS 
AFFAIRS 20-24 (2006), http://www.achpr.org/english/Special%20 Mechanisms/Indegenous/ 
ACHPR%20WGIP%20Report%20Summary%20version%20ENG.pdf. The Charter was 
adopted in 1981 and, by 2009, all fifty-three member nations of the African Union had 
deposited their instruments of ratification or accession. List of Countries That Have Signed, 
Ratified/Acceded to the African Union Convention on African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, AFRICAN UNION (May 26, 2007), http://www.achpr.org/eng 
lish/ratifications/ratification_african%20charter.pdf. Because ratifying governments were only 
paying lip service to the letters of the treaty, the Charter, much to the dismay of the human 
rights community, has contributed nothing meaningful to the protection of human rights in the 
region. Had it been otherwise, there would have been no need for the adoption, in 2000, of the 
Maputo Protocol, now glorified in some circles for, inter alia, being the first international 
treaty to explicitly recognize abortion as a human right. See generally Anthony Kuria Njoroge, 
The Protocol on the Rights of Women in African to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1 (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.emmabonino.it/campagne/stopfgm/djib 
outi/njoroge.pdf; The Maputo Protocol: Clear and Present Danger, HUMAN LIFE 
INTERNATIONAL 6-7, 17 (2009), http://maputoprotocol.org/maputo-protocol.pdf. Yet twenty-
three of the sixty-eight countries (nearly one-third) with the most restrictive abortion 
legislation (that ―either permit abortion only to save a woman‘s life or ban the procedure 
entirely‖) are in Africa. The World’s Abortion Laws, ISIS INT‘L (Aug. 12, 2008), http://www.is 
iswomen.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1079&Itemid=200. And here is 
the paradox. As of October, 2010, twelve of these same African countries (Angola, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda) had also ratified the Protocol which, in § 14(2)(c), permits  
abortions ―in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy 
endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus,‖ 
notwithstanding the apparent conflict with their respective national laws. List of Countries 
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the African Chapter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, AFRICAN UNION (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rig 
hts%20of%20Women.pdf.; see also The World’s Abortion Laws, Fact Sheet, CENTER FOR 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 1 (2009), http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/world-abortion-
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observed: ―Morality can and should overrule both law custom and practice, in fact, 
morality can and should overrule every other thing except its own very rationale.‖184 
At the base of human corporate existence, the relationship that binds one unto 
another, the cardinal prism from which human conduct and behavior ought to be 
assessed, is morality.185 Therefore, whether a law exists or not in respect to a 
particular conduct is not an argument for the legitimacy of the law. On the other 
hand, a practice which cannot be faulted on any morally ground is legitimate, even if 
condemned by the law. This is the fate of anti-FGR human rights framework, 
especially regarding consenting rational adults. 
 Another area of deficiency in the anti-FGR human rights framework is its failure 
to distinguish between FC and bona fide cases of FGM. Part IV of this paper 
established that although related, FC is not the same as FGM because FGM is 
morally evil, but FC is not. Just as human rights law does not distinguish, in terms of 
punishment, between consenting adults and those forced to undergo FGM, it does 
not distinguish between FGM and FC. The result is that all forms of FGR, regardless 
of severity, attract the same punishment. But the lesson of Part IV is that when faced 
with evil and mere moral wrongs, priority should be given to the evil. Because FC 
and other less invasive forms of FGR are mere wrongs, the punishment should not 
be the same as the punishment for FGM. The law should reflect these crucial 
distinctions by imposing minor punishments for less severe cases of FGM and 
impose no punishment for voluntary FGM. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The history of human civilization is strewn with repugnant and unconscionable 
cultural practices—practices once treasured as part of people‘s ineliminable identity, 
but which, over the years, have been consigned to the abyss of history. For centuries, 
killing twins was an acceptable cultural practice in Southeastern Nigeria.186 Because 
twins, or other multiple births, were viewed as curses by Ibos and Ibibios, newborns 
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were immediately killed or cast away in the evil forest, while the mother underwent 
a period of purification.187 The arrival of Christianity and the efforts of missionaries, 
over time, ensured the demise of the practice.188 Through persuasion, education, and 
reasoned dialogue, the people gradually realized the error of their ways.189 Criminal 
prohibition came later, after the groundwork had been laid. A similar approach may 
be needed to tackle the problem of FGM.  
This Article has demonstrated that demonizing all forms of FGR as FGM fails to 
advance eradication of the practice. Instead, it estranges the very people whose full 
and unwavering support is critical to the eradication process. We must distinguish 
between permanently harmful cultural practices and less severe ones, and the law 
must explicitly reflect this distinction. Because a clitoridotomy is clearly different 
from a clitoridectomy, grouping them together, as the WHO classification does, is a 
mistake. The Latin maxim culpae poenae par esto (let the punishment fit the crime) 
is a legal and ethical principle requiring that sanctions be apportioned according to 
the severity of the crime.190 As such, anti-FGR treaties and legislation must be 
amended to reflect this principle. Along the same trajectory, forced FGR must be 
decoupled from voluntary cases. There is no reason whatsoever to punish the 
conduct of adults that has no adverse impact on third-parties.  
Regarding forced FGM cases, criminalizing the procedure is commendable, but 
hardly adequate by itself to trigger needed change. A mechanism designed to change 
attitudes and behavior seems to be more productive. The value of education in this 
process cannot be underestimated; FGM and FC are more resisted by the educated 
class. Dissemination of information about the adverse consequences of the practice 
holds even greater prospect for success. Beneath all the abstractions, the people 
whose sufferings drive the debate are the mothers, aunts, sisters, and daughters of 
those insistent on perpetuating the practice.191 Care ethics, as shown in Part V, 
demonstrate that most people would wish no harm on their relatives, even if culture 
prescribes otherwise. But first people must have a full dose of information. 
What man, with full knowledge of the causal link between FGM and the 
gynecological problems suffered by his wife, would condemn his daughter to the 
same fate?192 Even amongst cultural aficionados, many would be less ferocious in 
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their demand for compliance under such circumstances. People must realize that 
whatever cultural significance FGR holds for them, it can be achieved through 
means that are free of deleterious health consequences.193 Through sustained 
education, people would come to realize that regardless of whether a particular 
cultural practice has existed for centuries, ―societies can and do endorse grave 
injustices [and] that societies, like their members, can be in need of moral 
improvement.‖194 After all, as WHO aptly notes: ―culture is not static; it is in 
constant flux, adapting and reforming.‖195 This means that attitude will only change 
when the practitioners ―understand the hazards and indignity of harmful practices 
and when they realize that it is possible to give up harmful practices without giving 
up meaningful aspects of their culture.‖196 
On whose shoulders should this heavy lifting lie? Because it has more resources 
at its disposal, the government has primary responsibility to mobilize the people. 
Others must take a secondary, though no less important, role, such as civil society 
organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), community-based 
organizations (CBOs), traditional leaders, and media organizations.197 CSOs are 
well-suited to translate official government policies into a workable formula. In 
2007, the African Union Conference of Ministers of Health called for countries in 
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the region to enlist the participation of these organizations in their national 
programs.198 Merging the capabilities of CSOs (in terms of technical expertise, 
proximity to the people, and familiarity with the terrain) and the government (in 
terms of resources) will bring the much needed attitudinal change. Ultimately, once 
people reflect honestly on the ramifications of FGM—and this is most effectively 
possible through massive awareness campaign and education—they will realize that 
the procedure, when forced on individuals, is indefensible as a legitimate cultural 
practice, but the government must respect the autonomy of those who voluntarily 
submit to the procedure. 
                                                          
 198 Id.   
